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Abstract: In Romania, as in many Central and Eastern Europe countries, 
during the communist regime all the banks were owned by the state and their 
activities were circumscribed by rigid norms. After the communist regime had fallen, 
the state owned banks had to adapt to a competitive environment. The management 
inefficiency, the political interests and the corruption led some of these banks to 
critical situations. Such circumstances convinced Romanian authorities to privatize 
the banks owned by state. From the seven state-owned banks that activated in the 
1990s in Romania, one had to be closed, four were privatized and two are still in the 
state propriety. In this paper we approach some turning points in the evolutions of 
these banks. We also try to configure the future of the remained state-owned banks.  
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The dispute over the optimal ownership structure of banks is one of the main 
dimensions of the controversy about the role that the state should play in the financial 
sector. In this debate various arguments were brought in favor or against the state-
owned banks (SOBs). The so-called development view considers that SOBs are 
more suitable than the private banks to finance the economic growth in developing 
countries (Gerschenkron, 1962; Andrianova et al, 2002). It claims that SOBs are 
suitable especially to support the development in rural and isolated areas where the 
private banks could hesitate to open branches (Burgess and Pande, 2003). This view 
is in the line with some development theories that consider that the government 
should own the firms from the strategic economic sectors (Lewis, 1950; Myrdal, 
1968).  Other arguments in favor of the presence of SOBs were provided by the so-
called social view which assigns to the public sector the role of correcting the markets 
imperfections (Stiglitz, 1994). A related view justifies the state ownership of banks by 
considering that some banking services have a public-good nature (Corrigan, 1982).  
In opposition with the development and social views, the political view over 
government’s involvement in the banking system considers that the SOBs are 
created and maintained by politicians as tools to reward their supporters (LaPorta et 
al., 2002; Sapienza, 2004). This view is in line with theories that criticize the 
government ownership of enterprises as promoting incompetence and corruption 
(Shleifer, A. 1998; Megginson, 2004). In case of SOBs, the political influence could 
affect the economic considerations of the credit allocation (Kane, 1977). As a result, 
in comparison with the privately owned banks, the state-owned banks have lower 
management efficiency, lower liquidity and greater credit risks (Cornett et al., 2003; 
Weintraub and Nakane, 2003; Yeyati et al., 2005; Micco et al., 2007).   
SOBs had a significant presence among the incipient forms of capitalist 
institutions. Megginson (2003) revealed that until 1980s, in countries with French civil 
law commercial codes the state ownership of banks was generally higher than those 
with German law, Scandinavian law or English common law codes. In the communist 
system introduced in the Soviet Union, banks served as instruments of control and 
funds allocation. The few banks allowed to activate functioned, in fact, as 
departments of a single bank (Sherif et al., 2003). After the World War II, such 
financial systems were imposed in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries 
which had fallen under the Soviet Union domination. The economic reforms initiated 
in Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev, known as perestroika, had a major impact on 
CEE countries. There were some notable attempts to reform the banking system by 
offering more autonomy to banks. In Hungary, in 1987, it was implemented a two-tier 
banking system.  
 Since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, when the neo-liberal policies 
started to be implemented, significant programs of SOBs privatization were launched 
in most of the developed countries and in many developing countries. In 1990s, after 
the fall of communist regimes, CEE countries joined to this trend.  
The dispute between SOBs and private banks, which seemed to be won by 
the last ones, was reignited by the recent global crisis. In present, the banking sector 
problems are perceived by the public opinion as one of the main factors which 
caused and aggravated the global crisis. It is admitted that large profits temptations 
made banks offer substantial loans with high risks. When the financial crisis erupted, 
many governments had to rescue, by enormous bailouts, the banks in difficulty which 
were considered “Too Big to Fail” or “Too Interconnected to Fail” or “Too 
Systematically Connected to Fail” (Molyneux et al., 2011). However, for the ordinary 
taxpayers it was not very easy to understand why public funds were spent for saving 
the rich bankers while the poor employees of small enterprises lost their jobs. It was 
also difficult to understand the reasons for saving some banks while others were left 
to fail. The actual global crisis revealed also the bank regulation failure which couldn’t 
keep the pace with the financial institutions irresponsible behavior. One of the main 
goals of bank regulation is to ensure the banking sector solvability. However, many 
banks perceive these requirements as impediments to obtain high profits and try to 
elude them by financial innovations and even by fraudulent practices. In fact, these 
banks undermine the measures meant to protect them. Such irresponsible behavior 
is stimulated by the fact these banks are confident the government would rescue 
them in the case of substantial losses. In the last decades and especially from the 
beginning of the financial turmoil several attempts to reform the banking sector were 
made. Such initiatives include more restrictive bank regulation, the narrow banking 
implementation or even the main banks nationalization. 
In this paper we approach the evolution of the Romanian SOBs in the last 
decades. During the communist regime Romania was a particular case among the 
CEE countries being considered, between 1964 and 1987, as the least obedient 
satellite of Soviet Union. From this position, the Romanian Communist Party, 
initiated, in the 1960s, a sort of economy liberalization but also strongly rejected the 
perestroika in the later 1980s. The banking system was highly controlled by the 
members of the former secret police some of them, managing to maintain their 
influence even after the fall of the communist regime. This influence has to be taken 
into consideration in any analysis of Romanian SOBs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as it follows. The second part describes the 
Romanian banking system, the third part presents the evolutions of seven SOBs, the 
fourth part approaches the perspective of the last remaining two SOBs and the fifth 
part concludes. 
 
The Banking system in Romania during and after the communist regime 
 
Between 1945 and 1948 Romania became the satellite of Soviet Union which 
imposed a communist regime. In the new financial system most of the credit 
operations were done by the central bank. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Romanian 
Communist Party, led by Gheorghe Gheorghiu - Dej and, from 1965, by Nicolae 
Ceausescu, gained a sort of autonomy from Soviet Union and it improved Romania’s 
political and economic relations with Western countries. In these years Romania was 
admitted to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, obtaining 
significant loans from these institutions and from the Western Governments. It was a 
period of liberalization for the Romanian economy and the authorities allowed some 
reforms in the banking systems. Some Romanian banks established cooperation 
relations with international financial institutions and with Western commercial banks. 
In the 1980s Romania, as many other developing countries, was affected by 
the foreign debt crisis. In these circumstances, the Romanian government adopted a 
radical strategy to pay back the whole foreign debt in less than ten years.  Drastic 
measures to reduce the imports and to increase the exports were implemented. In 
these years, the economy liberalization was stopped. Instead, it was substantially 
increased the involvement of the Romanian secret police, called “Securitate”, in the 
economic activity. Many banking operations were, in fact, controlled by “Securitate”. 
The drastic austerity measures eroded Ceausescu’s popularity among the Romanian 
people. Moreover, the new trend of political and economical liberalization induced in 
the Soviet Union by Mikhail Gorbachev, made the independent position of Romania 
less interesting for Western countries. Nicolae Ceausescu publicly rejected 
perestroika and any suggestions of reforms. 
In December 1989, the regime of Nicolae Ceausescu fell. The new 
government, obviously linked by the former Romanian Communist Party and by 
Securitate, adopted rather slow reforms toward the market economy. However, in 
January 1990, a two-tier banking system was introduced. The main roles assigned to 
the new central bank – National Bank of Romania (NBR) were to conduct the 
monetary policy and to supervise the banking operations. Instead, its commercial 
operations were transferred to a new created bank. The existent banks were 
organized as companies owned by the state.  
The new legislation allowed for the creation of private banks, but the system of 
supervision was inconsistent. In these circumstances and since the big international 
private banks were reticent to establish subsidiaries in Romania, most of the private 
banks in the early 1990s were in fact organized with frauds purposes. Soon they 
became bankrupted and many deponents lost their money. This situation contributed 
to a substantial lack of trust regarding the private banks. In fact, in this period of time, 
substantial losses occurred also in SOBs because frauds or inefficient management, 
but the authorities avoided radical measures to solve this situation. 
In the late 1990s the change of the political regime and the pressures from 
international financial institutions led to substantial reforms in the Romanian banking 
system. NBR has tightened the supervision rules. The government had to accept the 
closing of the largest Romanian SOBs and it engaged to privatize other banks. The 
Government sold shares of four SOBs to foreign private banks. In the present, only 
two SOBs still activate in Romania.  
 
Evolutions of the Romanian SOBs 
In the early 1990s seven SOBs functioned in Romania: Bancorex, Banca 
Agricola, CEC Bank, Banca Comerciala Romana, Banca Romana de Dezvoltare, 
Bancpost and Exim Bank. Since then they experienced different ways: one of them 
was closed, four were privatized and two are still owned by the state. 
 
1. Bancorex - In 1968, when Romania’s economic relations with Western 
countries flourished, the authorities established a specialized bank for financing the 
foreign trade activities: Banca Romana de Comert Exterior (BRCE). From the 
beginning, BRCE was supervised by DIE, a department of the former secret police 
specialized in foreign relations. In 1980s, when Ceausescu regime decided to 
accelerate the pay back of the foreign debt, BRCE was involved in secret and, 
sometimes, illegal operations performed by ICE Dunarea, a firm owned by DIE.  
After December 1989, when the communist regime fell, some changes were 
operated in the bank top management, but its functional structure remained 
unchanged.  In 1990, BRCE was transformed in Bancorex, a state-owned bank. In 
the early 1990s Bancorex was the largest bank of Romania and its employees 
enjoyed the reputation of being familiarized with capitalist business. It was also 
preferred by the government in financing the foreign trade. In fact, Bancorex was 
used as a tool for offering subsidies to the state enterprises in forms of loans which 
were never repaid.  
Beside that, the political influence facilitated a massive corruption. As later 
enquires revealed, during 1990s several politicians and businessmen with political 
connections obtained from Bancorex substantial loans in very favorable conditions. 
By sophisticated transactions, the bank financed also political parties. Moreover, in 
order to obtain a kind of immunity for the eventual investigations, the Bancorex 
managers signed an agreement with Interior Ministry by which loans with very low 
interest rates were offered to Romanian policemen.  
Over the years, such practices generated massive losses which became 
unbearable. In 1997, under the pressures of international financial institutions, the 
Romanian Government publicly admitted the dangerous situation and it announced a 
600 million dollars aid meant to solve the problem of the nonperforming loans. 
However, in the absence of a real restructuring of the bank management, this 
substantial amount proved not to be enough to save Bancorex.  
In 1999, a new estimation indicated that the largest Romanian SOB needed 
another 2 billion dollars aid. Unable to provide this amount, which represented more 
than 5 percent of Romania’s GDP, the government had to accept the closing of 
Bancorex. In order to avoid new tensions on the financial markets, government 
announced that the majority of  Bancorex’s assets and liabilities were transferred to 
Banca Comerciala Romana and to a new created institution designed to deal with the 
banks bad assets: Agentia de Valorificare a Activelor Bancare (AVAB). Then, what 
remained from Bancorex merged with Banca Comerciala Romana. The officials 
enquire about the frauds from Bancorex failed to disclose the involvement of 
politicians.  
The former general manager of the bank was jailed for some years, but finally 
he was not found guilty by the Romanian justice. For the public opinion it was offered 
the explanation that Bancorex was sacrificed for the Romanian citizens that could 
buy, thanks to the bank operations, energy at low prices.  
2. Banca Agricol - In 1968 Banca pentru Agricultur si Industria Alimentar 
(BAIA) was created for financing the agricultural activity. In December 1990 BAIA 
was transformed in Banca Agricol (BA). As in the case of Bancorex, the political 
influence led to a massive corruption and the bad credits brought the bank in a critical 
situation. In 2000 its losses were estimated to 800 millions USD.  
The lesson of Bancorex convinced the Romanian authorities to act with 
determination. It was found a foreign bank, Raiffeisen Zentralbank Osterreich AG 
(RZB), that had already established a Romanian subsidiary: Raiffeisenbank 
(Romania) S.A. In November 2001 RZB agreed to borrow BA that was renamed as 
Banca Agricola Raiffeisen S.A. In June 2002 Raiffeisenbank (Romania) S.A. and 
Banca Agricola Raiffeisen S.A. merged, forming Raiffeisen Bank Romania S.A.  
Under the new management the bank performances improved substantially and from 
the next years the losses were replaced by profits.  
3. CEC Bank. In 1864, five year after the modern state Romania was born, the 
government established “Casa de Depuneri i Consemnaiuni” – first state owned 
deposit and consignments institution. Sixteen years later, the government created 
“Casa de Economii” – a state owned savings institution which was formally attached 
to “Casa de Depuneri i Consemnaiuni”. In 1930, in the context of a deep recession 
accompanied by the instability of the banking system, “Casa de Economii” was 
separated from “Casa de Depuneri i Consemnaiuni” and reorganized under the 
name “Casa General de Economii”.  After two years, “Casa General de Economii” 
was renamed as “Casa Naional de Economii i Cecuri Potale”.  
In 1949, the communist authorities decided to reunify “Casa de Depuneri i 
Consemnaiuni” and “Casa Nationala de Economii i Cecuri Potale” under the name 
of “Casa Nationala de Economii i Consemnaiuni” (CEC). The new state owned 
institution was the only one authorized to attract the population savings. In time, CEC 
developed a network of branches localized in small and big cities. New savings and 
payments instruments were introduced and in 1970s. CEC was allowed to offer 
credits for houses acquisitions.  
The fall of the communist regime brought significant changes in CEC activity. In the 
early 1990s, despite the competition from the new established banks, CEC remained 
the most important savings institution. Although, in comparison with other banks, 
CEC applied lower interest rates, it was preferred by large categories of population, 
especially by old or rural people. The Government used the large financial resources 
collected by CEC in operations with government securities or even to borrow banks 
in needs of liquidity. In 1996 CEC was transformed in a joint-stock company with the 
Finance Ministry as the unique shareholder. In these years, the bank efficiency was 
affected by the fact that its leaderships failed to introduce modern and diversified 
services that CEC competitors applied.   
The substantial financial resources of CEC attracted a lot of politicians and 
businessmen. The most famous of them was Sorin Ovidiu Vîntu, considered as one 
of the richest Romanian businessmen in 1990s and 2000s (he was also involved in 
the losses occurred at Banca Agricol). In 1983, when he was imprisoned for 
embezzlement, S. O. Vintu was recruited as informer by the former communist secret 
police. His activity in the service of the secret police is still controversial. However, in 
1990s Vîntu appeared as the owner of some firms specialized in investments on the 
financial markets in which he employed a lot of former Securitate’s officers. One of 
these firms, SOV Invest S.A., created in 1996 a mutual fund called “Fondul Naional 
de Investitii” (FNI), which promised average annual returns that surpassed 300%. In 
fact, FNI was a Ponzi scheme in which the real assets were inflated by fraudulent 
practices. By an aggressive publicity, FNI managed to attract the investors becoming 
in few years the Romanian largest investment fund. To this achievement, the political 
connections played a major role. In 1999 the leadership of CEC signed an agreement 
that guaranteed FNI investment certificates. Moreover, CEC invested 290 billions 
ROL (about 18 millions dollars) in FNI certificates. These facts induced a kind of 
moral hazard in the investors’ behavior which believed that the state guaranteed FNI. 
Lately it was estimated that after it had been announced the agreement between 
CEC and SOV Invest S.A. about one hundred thousands of investors bought FNI 
certificates. 
As in all the Ponzi schemes, the fabulous returns promised by FNI couldn’t last for 
long. In May 2000, it was announced the FNI’s failure. More than three hundreds 
thousands of investors found out that their certificates became useless and they 
claimed that their losses to be covered by CEC. The eventuality of FNI investors’ 
compensation by public funds raised a concern about the macroeconomic stability. In 
June 2000, the Romanian Government sent a Supplementary Letter of Intent to the 
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund engaging that the FNI 
investors wouldn’t be compensated. The investors addressed to the justice trying to 
recuperate their losses but the trials lasted for many years with no conclusive result. 
An official enquire about the fraudulent practices of FNI management was opened 
but failed, for many years, to elucidate the circumstances in which a state-owned 
institution guaranteed a Ponzi scheme. However, in time, there were revealed the 
linkages between Sorin Ovidiu Vîntu (who had managed to sell SOV Invest shortly 
before the collapse of FNI) and politicians and personalities from mass media.  
The bankruptcy of the largest investment fund and the involvement of the state-
owned savings bank raised a concern about the Romanian financial system stability. 
Many deponents of CEC and other SOBs rushed to withdraw their deposits. A lot of 
credit cooperatives which, as FNI, attracted hundreds of thousands of deponents by 
promising high interest rates, became also bankrupted. The economic consequences 
were accompanied by political ones. The largest party of the governmental majority 
(PN-cd, the party that had named the leadership of CEC), dropped sharply in 
popularity and disappeared from Parliament at the next elections. 
In the years that followed FNI scandal, the new leaderships of CEC tried to restore 
the bank credibility. Modern banking practices were introduced, enabling CEC to 
compete with the commercial banks. In 2005, pressed by international financial 
institutions, the Romanian Government approved a strategy of privatization for CEC. 
However, since the price offered by a foreign bank was too low, the privatization was 
delayed. In 2008 a new statute was introduced and the name of institution was 
changed to CEC Bank.  
3. Banca Comercial Român. In 1990 the Romanian government 
established a new SOB, called Banca Comercial Român (BCR) which was aimed 
to take over the commercial operations from NBR. In the early 1990s the main 
payments of state enterprises were operated by BCR. Perhaps because this situation 
the authorities tried to keep BCR away from the financial scandals. The bank 
leadership was opened to bring new instruments on the Romanian banking markets: 
payments through EUROPAY or by cards, treasury loans for individuals etc.  
In 1999, BCR had to absorb Bancorex, becoming the largest Romanian bank. In the 
next year the bank had to face the turbulences on the Romanian financial system 
caused by FNI bankruptcy. In never elucidated circumstances, rumors about linkages 
between BCR and FNI appeared making a significant part of its clients to withdraw 
their deposits. However, with the help of NBR and the government, BCR managed to 
pass this difficult situation.  
In the 2000s the bank continued to act as a pioneer in introducing new banking 
services. BCR was the first Romanian bank which traded securities on secondary 
markets, which launched mortgage loans or which installed Currency Exchange 
Machines. The bank also established two branches specialized in leasing and in 
insurance. In 2003 the Romanian government initiated the privatization of BCR 
selling a block of shares to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and to the International Finance Corporation. In 2006, the Austrian bank Erste Bank 
bought more than 60 percent of the BCR shares.  
4. Banca Român de Dezvoltare. In 1957 in Romania it was established 
Banca de Investiii (BI) aimed to finance the investment in industry. During the 
communist regime, BI was used for receiving most of the funds provided by the 
World Bank.  
In 1990 BI was transformed in a commercial state-owned bank named Banca 
Romana de Dezvoltare (BRD). During the negotiations with international financial 
institutions, Romanian authorities agreed to allow foreign banks to buy BRD shares. 
In these circumstances, BRD was in generally kept away from big fraudulent 
practices that affected Bancorex, BA and CEC. However, in 1990s it was revealed a 
fraud committed by a politician who had managed to obtain substantial credits from 
BRD.  
In December 1998 the French bank Société Générale (SG) became the owner of 51 
percent of BRD shares. In the next years the participation of SG to BRD shares 
gradually increased. In 2003 BRD changed its name in BRD - Société Générale. 
5. Bancpost. In 1991, when the Romanian state-owned company of 
telecommunications, RomPostTelecom, was reorganized, a part of its assets was 
used in creating a new commercial bank, called Bancpost. In 1997 the authorities 
elaborated a plan for the bank’s privatization. As in the case of BRD, the inclusion on 
the list of privatization kept Bancpost away from the big financial frauds. 
In 2003, the Greek bank Eurobank Ergasias bought the majority of Bancpost shares. 
Until 2009, its participation in Bancpost shares increased to 99 percent. In these 
years Eurobank Ergasias initiated programs for the modernization of Bancpost. 
6. Exim Bank. As a part of the new foreign trade policy, in 1992 Romanian 
authorities established bank aimed to finance Romanian exporters, named Exim 
Bank. The model was Export-Import Bank of the United States, an institution 
specialized in financing US exports. 
Until now, the support provided by Exim Bank to Romanian exporters was criticized. 
There were also allegations that the very well paid managers of the bank were 
named on political criteria. It was found that some of them were officers of the former 
secret police.   
Perspectives of the two remaining SOBs from Romania 
In present only two Romanian banks are state-owned: Exim Bank and CEC 
Bank. The missions they have to fulfill make their situations quite different.  
Since the adhesion to European Union, the necessity of redesign the 
Romanian foreign trade policy became obviously. In this context Exim Bank had to be 
reorganized, to be more closed to exporters and more efficient. Although the bank 
could remain state-owned it would be desirable the transparency in naming its 
leadership and even introducing a private management.  
In the actual context of the global crisis the privatization of CEC Bank has to 
be postponed. Usually, during such critical conditions, the deponents trust more in 
SOBs than in the private banks so the announcement of the bank privatization could 
spread some worries among the clients. In fact, CEC Bank could play a major role in 
the efforts to reorganize the national banking system. Such a reform could have four 
main dimensions: 
1. implementation of a state-owned payment and saving system; 
2. establishment of state insurance system specialized in bank activities; 
3. the ban, by law, of the government to bailout banks; 
4. the gradually relaxation of the minim capital requirements for banks. 
1. Implementation of a state-owned payment and saving system. A state-
owned payment and saving system will offer an alternative to people and enterprises 
which want to eliminate the counterpart risk in such transactions. In order to bring 
stability to this system strict requirements have to be fulfilled. Only less than 75 
percents of the collected funds could be lent and only to the central government. The 
interest rates for deposits will be established by the government taking into 
consideration the inflation forecasts. Anyway, these interest rates could be lower than 
those practiced by the banks since the involved risks are insignificant.  
2. Establishment of state insurance system specialized in bank activities. 
In the case of a big financial institution bankruptcy, a private insurance corporation 
could have some difficulties in fulfilling its obligations. Instead, a state owned 
insurance system would be more appropriate to deal with such a situation. The 
commercial banks will not be obliged to use the new insurance system but those will 
do will gain, probably, the customers trust. The insured banks have to respect strict 
requirements regarding their capitals and the risks taken in their operations. The 
indemnities will be granted only after rigorous analysis of the circumstances in which 
the losses occurred. 
3. The ban, by law, of the government to bailout banks. In fact, after the 
state payments and the savings systems implementation and the new insurance 
system creation, the government will have no reason for such an intervention since 
the affected customers were aware of the risks taken when they chose to use the 
bank services instead of those provided by the state. 
4. The gradually relaxation of the minim capital requirements for banks. 
Since the government no longer bailout the financial institutions it is justified a 
relaxation of the bank regulation, especially the minim capital requirements. 
However, this process will be implemented only gradually, in order to not disturb the 
monetary stability. In the new circumstances the banks will gain more freedom by the 
relaxation of regulation, but they have to learn to act responsibly in such a context. 
They and their customers should be aware they couldn’t count on the government 
intervention in critical situations. It is possible that these changes to make many 
banks voluntarily adopt prudential norms for their operations. 
In applying such a reform CEC Bank could be easily transformed in a state-
owned payment and saving system. In order to avoid political interferences it will be 
desirable that the new institution to be subordinate not to the Government but to the 
central bank. 
Conclusions 
In this paper we approached the changes experienced by the state-owned 
banks from Romania during and after the communist regime. 
One of them had to be closed and other two passed critical situations mainly 
because of the political interferences that facilitated fraudulent practices. In that 
transition period, the SOBs privatization was viewed as the most adequate solution to 
heal the Romanian banking system. Four SOBs were bought by foreign private banks 
which provided the capitals and experience needed for surviving in the increasing 
competitive environment. The experience of Banca Agricol, which was near 
bankruptcy in 2000 and became profitable in short time after the privatization it is an 
obvious proof about the private management advantages. 
However, the critical situation of the three SOBs in the 1990s does not mean 
that state ownership of the banks has to be always associated with inefficiency and 
corruption. During transition, when the supervising system of banking activities was 
very relaxed, many Romanian private banks also collapsed. In that turbulent period 
the state institutions were weak and unable to fight against corruption. In fact, any 
analysis of the economic processes occurred in the 1990s in Romania and in other 
CEE countries has to take into consideration the influence of the former secret police 
and the groups of interests inherited from the communist regime. 
The future of the two remaining SOBs is very difficult to anticipate. In the case 
of Exim Bank, the existence of a SOB that finances the exports is a controversy not 
only in Romania but also in the United States. Anyway, it is indicated a rethinking of 
Exim Bank strategy. In the case of CEC Bank, the privatization should be postponed 
at least after the end of the actual global crisis. Meanwhile, CEC Bank could be 
transformed in a state-owned payment and savings system.  
   
References 
1. Abarbanell, Jeffrey S. and Bonin John, P. (1997), “Bank Privatization in 
Poland: The Case of Bank Slaski”, Journal of Comparative Economics 25, pp. 31-61 
2. Abarbanell, Jeffrey S. and Meyendorff, Anna (1997), “Bank Privatization in 
Post-Communist Russia: The Case of Zhilsotsbank”, Journal of Comparative 
Economics 25, pp. 62-96 
3. Andrews, Michael (2005), "State-Owned Banks, Stability, Privatization, and 
Growth: Practical Policy Decisions in a World without Empirical Proof", IMF Working 
Papers 05/10, International Monetary Fund. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=874231 
4. Altunbas, Yener, Evans, Lynne and Molyneux, Philip (2001), "Bank 
Ownership and Efficiency", Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell 
Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 926-54, November 
5. Altunbas, Yener, Manganelli, Simone and Marques-Ibanez, David (2012), 
"Bank Risk during the Financial Crisis: Do business models matter?", Working 
Papers 12003, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales) 
6. Andrianova, Svetlana, Demetriades, Panicos O., Shortland, Anja (2006), 
“Government Ownership of Banks, Institutions, and Financial Development”, Journal 
of Development Economics, August, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=941185 
7. Barth, James R., Caprio, Gerard and Levine, Ross, “Banking Systems 
Around the Globe: Do Regulation and Ownership Affect Performance and Stability?” 
(November 1999). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2325, Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=630697 
8. Beck, Thorsten, Crivelli, Juan Miguel and Summerhill, William, “State Bank 
Transformation in Brazil - Choices and Consequences” (June 2005), World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 3619, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=755004 
9. Berger, Allen N., Clarke, George R. G., Cull, Robert,  Klapper, Leora and 
Udell, Gregory F. (2005), "Corporate governance and bank performance: a joint 
analysis of the static, selection, and dynamic effects of domestic, foreign, and state 
ownership", Policy Research Working Paper Series 3632, The World Bank 
10. Bichsel, Robert and Spielmann, Christian (2004), “State-owned Banks as 
Competition Enhancers, or the Grand Illusion”, July, EFMA Basel Meetings Paper, 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=498264 
11. Bonin, J., Hasan, I. and Watchel P. (2003), “Privatization Matters: Bank 
Performance in Transition Countries”, Paper presented at the World Bank 
Conference on Bank Privatization in Low and Middle-Income Countries, November 
23, Washington, DC 
12. Burgess, Robin and Pande, Rohini (2004), "Do Rural Banks Matter? 
Evidence from the Indian Social Banking Experiment", CEPR Discussion Paper 
4211, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=502103 
13. Caprio, Jr., Gerald, and Daniela, Klingebiel (1996), “Banking insolvencies: 
Cross country experience”, Mimeo, World Bank 
14. Claessens, Stijn, Demirguc-Kunt, Asli and Huizinga, Harry (2001), "How 
does foreign entry affect domestic banking markets?", Journal of Banking & Finance, 
Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 891-911, May 
15. Cornett, Marcia Millon, Lin Guo, Shahriar Khaksari and Hassan Tehranian 
(2003), “The Impact of Corporate Governance on Performance Differences in 
Privately-Owned versus State – Owned Banks: An International Comparison”, 
Working paper, Boston College, Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333127 
16. Demirguc, Asli and Huizinga, Harry (1999), "Determinants of Commercial 
Bank Interest Margins and Profitability: Some International Evidence", World Bank 
Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 13(2), pages 379-408, May 
17. Frydman, Roman, Cheryl Gray, Mark Hessel, and Andrzej Rapaczynski 
(1999), “Private ownership and corporate performance: Evidence from the transition 
economies”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 1153-1192 
18. Gerschenkron, Alexander (1962), Economic Backwardness in Historical 
Perspective, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press 
19. Jagtiani, Julapa A. and Brewer, Elijah (2009), “How Much Did Banks Pay 
to Become Too-Big-To-Fail and to Become Systemically Important?” (December 3), 
FRB of Philadelphia Working Paper No. 09-34; AFA 2011 Denver Meetings Paper, 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548105 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1548105 
20. Jensen, M., and W. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the Firm, Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics 
3: 305-360 
21. Kane, J. (1975), “Development Banking”, Lexington Books 
22. Kornai, Janos (1979), “Resource-constrained versus demand-constrained 
systems”, Econometrica 47, 801-819 
23. Khwaja Asim Ijaz and Mian Atif (2005), "Do Lenders Favor Politically 
Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market", The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 120(4), pages 1371-1411, November  
24. La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2002), 
"Government Ownership of Banks", The Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 265-
301 
25. Laeven, Luc (2001), "Insider Lending and Bank Ownership: The Case of 
Russia", Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 207-229, 
June 
26. Lewis, W. Arthur (1950), The Principles of Economic Planning, London: G. 
Allen & Unwin 
27. Megginson, W. (2003), “The Economics of Bank Privatization”, Paper 
presented at the World Bank Conference on Bank Privatization in Low and Middle-
Income Countries, November 23, Washington, DC 
28. Megginson, W. (2004), The Financial Economics of Privatization, New 
York, United States: Oxford University Press 
29. Micco, Alejandro and Panizza, Ugo (2006), "Bank Ownership and Lending 
Behavior", POLIS Working Papers 61, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - 
POLIS 
30. Micco, Alejandro, Panizza, Ugo and Yanez, Monica (2007), "Bank 
ownership and performance. Does politics matter?", Journal of Banking & Finance, 
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 219-241, January 
31. Molyneux, Philip, Schaeck, Klaus and Zhou, Tim Mi (2011), “Too 
Systemically Important to Fail” in Banking (November 1), Bangor Business School 
Working Paper No. 11/011, Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986013 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1986013 
32. Myrdal, Gunnar (1968), Asian Drama, New York: Pantheon 
33. Otchere, Isaac (2003), “Do Privatized Banks in Middle- and Low-Income 
Countries Perform Better than Rival Banks? An Intra-Industry Analysis of Bank 
Privatization”, Working paper, University of Melbourne 
34. Perotti, Enrico (1993), “Bank Lending in Transition Economies”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance 17, pp. 1021-1032 
35. Petrovic A., Tutsch R. (2009), “National rescue measures in response to 
the current financial crisis”, ECB Legal Working Paper Series, No. 8, Frankfurt 
36. Sapienza, P. (2004), “The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank 
Lending”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 72, pp. 357-384 
37. Shirley, Mary and Walsh, Patrick (2000), “Public vs. Private Ownership: 
The Current State of the Debate”, Working paper, World Bank Group, Washington, 
DC 
38. Shleifer, A. (1998), “State Versus Private Ownership”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 12: 133-150 
39. Sherif Khaled, Borish Michael S. and Gross Alexandra (2003), “State-
Owned Banks in the Transition: Origins, Evolution, and Policy Responses”, World 
Bank Publications 
40. Stiglitz, J. (1994), “The Role of the State in Financial Markets”, 
Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Economic Development 1993, 
Washington, DC, United States: World Bank 
41. S. M., Stolz and M., Wedow (2010), “Extraordinary measures in 
extraordinary time - public measures in support of the financial sector in the EU and 
the United States”, ECB Occasional Paper Series, No. 117, Frankfurt 
42. Weintraub, Baumohl Daniela and Márcio I. Nakane (2003), „Bank 
Privatization and Productivity: Evidence for Brazil“, Working paper, University of Sao 
Paula (Brazil) 
43. Yeyati Eduardo Levy, Micco Alejandro and Panizza Ugo (2004), "Should 
the Government be in the Banking Business? The Role of State-Owned and 
Development Banks", RES Working Papers 4379, Inter-American Development 
Bank, Research Department 
44. Yeyati Eduardo Levy, Micco Alejandro and Panizza Ugo (2005), State-
Owned Banks Do They Promote or Depress Financial Development and Economic 
Growth?, Conference on Public Banks in Latin America: Myths and Reality Inter-
American Development Bank , February 25 
45. Zoli, Edda (2001), “Cost and Effectiveness of Banking Sector 
Restructuring in Transition Economies”, IMF Working Paper 157, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC 
 
 
 
